Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was born in London to the family of the Lord Keeper of the Seal under Queen Elizabeth. From the age of 12 he studied at the University of Cambridge (College of the Holy Trinity). Choosing a political career as his life field, Bacon received his law degree. In 1584 he was elected to the House of Commons, in 1618 he was appointed to the post of Lord Chancellor. In the spring of 1621, Bacon was accused of corruption by the House of Lords, put on trial and was released from severe punishment only by the grace of King James I. At this, Bacon's political activity ended, and he completely devoted himself to scientific pursuits, activities.

The problems of the method of scientific knowledge are outlined by F. Bacon in his work "New Organon" , which was published in 1620. In the published posthumously "New Atlantis" he sets out a project for the state organization of science, which, according to historians of science, is an anticipation of the creation of European academies of sciences.

F. Bacon is considered the founder of the tradition of empiricism both in England ("insular empiricism"), and in modern European philosophy in general. "Insular empiricism" is a designation of the epistemological position characteristic of British philosophers and opposed to the so-called "continental rationalism" prevalent on the European continent in the 17th century. epistemological rationalism in the narrow sense. Following Fr. Bacon's "insular empiricism" was developed in British philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries. T. Hobbes, J. Locke, J. Berkeley, D. Hume and others.

Empiricism (Greek empeiria - experience) is a trend in epistemology, according to which sensory experience is the basis of knowledge, its main source and criterion of reliability (truth). Empiricism includes sensationalism, but does not coincide with the latter. Sensualism (Latin sensus - feeling, sensation) reduces the entire content of knowledge to sensations. His motto: "There is nothing in the mind that was not previously in the senses." Proponents of empiricism see the foundation of knowledge in experience, which includes knowledge and skills that are formed on the basis of sensory data as a result of the activity of consciousness as a whole and practice.

The main motives of Bacon's philosophy are the knowledge of nature and the subordination of it to human power. He pays special attention precisely to the knowledge of nature, believing that the truth extracted from there is highly needed by man.

Like any radical reformer, Bacon paints the past in gloomy colors and is full of bright hopes for the future. Until now, the state of the sciences and mechanical arts has been extremely poor. Of the 25 centuries of development of human culture, only six are recruited that are favorable for science ( Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, New time). The rest of the time is marked by lapses in knowledge, marking time, chewing on the same speculative philosophy.

Bacon believes that until now natural science has taken an insignificant part in human life... Philosophy, "this great mother of all sciences has been humiliated to the contemptuous position of a servant." Philosophy, having cast aside its abstract form, must enter into a "legal marriage" with natural science, for only then will it be able to "bear children and deliver real benefits and honest pleasures." The importance of science lies in its importance to humans. Science is not knowledge for the sake of knowledge. The ultimate goal of science is invention and discovery. The purpose of inventions is human benefit, satisfaction of needs and improvement of people's lives. "We can do as much as we know." "Fruits and practical inventions are, as it were, guarantors and witnesses of the truth of philosophies."

Bacon believes that those who worked in the field of science in the past were either empiricists or dogmatists. “The empiricists, like the ant, only collect and are content with the collected. Rationalists, like a spider, make a web of themselves. The bee, on the other hand, chooses the middle way: it extracts material from garden and field flowers, but disposes and changes it according to its skill. The true business of philosophy does not differ from this either. For it is not based solely or predominantly on the forces of the mind and does not deposit intact material extracted from natural history and mechanical experiments into consciousness, but changes it and processes it in the mind. So, good hope should be placed on a closer and more indestructible (which has not yet happened) union of these two abilities - experience and reason. "

According to Bacon, the constructive, positive part of the new philosophy should be preceded by a destructive, negative part directed against the reasons that hinder mental progress. These reasons lie in all sorts of "idols", "ghosts", prejudices to which the human mind is subject. Bacon points to four types of "idols", "ghosts".

1. Idols of the "kind" (idola tribus).The very nature of man is characterized by the limitation of the mind and the imperfection of the senses. “Just as an uneven mirror changes the course of rays from objects in accordance with its own shape and cross-section, so the mind, being exposed to things through the medium of the senses, in developing and inventing its concepts, sins against fidelity by interweaving and mixing with the nature of things its own nature ". Interpreting nature "by analogy with man," nature is attributed to ultimate goals, etc.

To the same kind of idols should be attributed to the human mind's desire for generalizations that are not substantiated by a sufficient number of facts. Because of this, the human mind soars from the smallest facts to the broadest generalizations. That is why, emphasizes Bacon, weights must be suspended from the wings of the mind so that it stays closer to the ground, to the facts. " For the sciences, good should be expected only when we ascend the true ladder, and not intermittent steps - from particulars to lesser axioms and then to middle ones, and, finally, to the most general ... Therefore, the human mind must be given not wings, but rather, lead and gravity, so that they restrain his every jump and flight ... ".

2. Idols of the "cave" (idola specus). These are individual deficiencies in cognition, due to the peculiarities of the bodily organization, upbringing, environment, circumstances that cause certain addictions, because a person is inclined to believe in the truth of what he prefers. As a result, each person has "his own special cave, which breaks and distorts the light of nature." So, some are inclined to see differences in things, others - similarities, some are committed to tradition, others are gripped by a sense of the new, etc. Idols of the "cave" push people to extremes.

3. Idols of "square", or "market", "market square" (idola fori). « There are also idols that occur, as it were, due to the mutual connection and community of people. We call these idols, meaning the communication that generates them and the fellowship of people, the idols of the square. People are united by speech. Words are established according to the understanding of the crowd. Therefore, the bad and absurd establishment of words is amazingly besieging the mind. "... These idols are the most painful, because despite such confidence of people (and even by virtue of it), words gradually penetrate into human consciousness and often distort the logic of reasoning. "Words directly violate the mind, confuse everything and lead people to empty and countless arguments and interpretations."

Criticism of the idols of the square is directed, first of all, against the imperfection of everyday language: the polysemy of words, the uncertainty of their content. At the same time, it is also a criticism of scholastic philosophy, which tends to invent and use the names of non-existent things (for example, "fate", "prime mover", etc.), as a result of which the mind is drawn into pointless, meaningless and fruitless disputes.

4. Idols of "theater" or "theories" (idola theatri). These include false theories and philosophical teachings like comedies, representing fictional and artificial worlds. People are prone to blind faith in authorities, following which a person perceives things not as they really exist, but biased, with prejudice. Those possessed by these idols try to enclose the diversity and richness of nature in one-sided schemes of abstract constructions. All cliches, dogmas corrupt the mind.

Fighting authoritarian thinking is one of Bacon's primary concerns. Only one authority should be unconditionally recognized, the authority of Holy Scripture in matters of faith, but in cognizing Nature, the mind should rely only on experience in which Nature is revealed to it. “Some of the new philosophers, with the greatest frivolity, went so far,” F. Bacon ironically, “tried to base natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis, on the book of Job and on other sacred writings. This vanity must be all the more restrained and suppressed because not only fantastic philosophy, but also a heretical religion is derived from the reckless confusion of the divine and the human. Therefore, it will be more salvific if a sober mind gives faith only what belongs to it. " Breeding two truths - divine and human - allowed Bacon to strengthen the autonomy of science and scientific activity.

Thus, an impartial mind, freed from all kinds of prejudices, open to Nature and attentive to experience - this is the starting point of Baconian philosophy. To master the truth of things, it remains to resort to the correct method of working with experience. This method should be induction, "which would produce separation and selection in experience and, through appropriate exclusions and rejections, would draw the necessary conclusions."

Inductive method. Bacon demonstrates his understanding of the inductive method by the example of finding the nature, the "form" of heat. The research proceeds as follows. Three tables are compiled. In the first one (tabula praesentiae, "table of presence"), objects are collected and recorded in which the phenomenon under study is present (rays of the Sun, lightning, flame, red-hot metals, etc.). The second table (tabula absentiae, "table of absence") contains objects similar to those listed in the first table, but in which there is no heat (rays of the moon, stars, phosphorus glow, etc.). Finally, there are objects (for example, stone, metal, wood, etc.), which usually do not produce the sensation of warmth, but in which it is present to a greater or lesser extent. The degrees of warmth of these objects are recorded in the third table (tabula graduum, "table of degrees").

A logical analysis of these tables makes it possible to find the circumstance that exists everywhere where there is heat, and is absent where there is no heat. If we find this circumstance ("nature"), then we will thereby find the cause ("form") of heat. Using logical devices (analogy, the method of exclusion using categorical, conditional-categorical and dividing syllogism), we exclude a number of circumstances until the one that is the cause of warmth remains. This reason, Bacon shows, is motion, which is present wherever there is warmth.

Research using the inductive method leads Bacon to the conclusion about the existence of a number of "forms", such as density, heaviness, etc. The number of simple forms is finite (Bacon names 19). Each empirically complex given thing consists of their various combinations and combinations. For clarity, Bacon makes a comparison with language: just as words are composed of letters, so bodies are composed of simple forms; just as knowledge of letters enables us to understand words, knowledge of forms will lead us to the knowledge of complex bodies. So, for example, gold has a yellow color, a certain specific gravity, malleability, fusibility, etc. Each of these properties has its own "shape".

In conclusion, it should be noted that the significance of F. Bacon's teachings is much wider than the simple introduction of the inductive method into scientific research. In fact, F Bacon stands at the origins of the formation of that ideal of scientificity, which later received the name "Physical ideal of scientific character", where the central role is assigned to the empirical basis, and the theoretical axiomatics has an empirical character. 1

The foundations of a rationalist tradition alternative to empiricism were laid by the French philosopher René Descartes.

René Descartes (1596-1650) was born into a family that belonged to the noble family of Touraine, which predetermined his future on the path of military service. In the Jesuit school, which Descartes graduated from, he showed a strong inclination to study mathematics and an unconditional rejection of the scholastic tradition. War life (and Descartes had to take part in the Thirty Years' War) did not attract the thinker, and in 1629 he left the service and chose the place of his residence in the freest country in Europe at that time - Holland - and for 20 years he was exclusively engaged in scientific works. During this period of his life, the main works were written on the methodology of scientific knowledge: "Rules for Guiding the Mind" and "Discourse on the method." In 1649 he accepts an invitation from the Swedish Queen Christina to help her found the Academy of Sciences. Unaccustomed to the philosopher's daily routine (meeting with the "royal student" at 5 o'clock in the morning), the harsh climate of Sweden and hard work caused his premature death.

Descartes was one of the founders of modern science. He has made notable contributions to a variety of scientific disciplines. In algebra, he introduced alphabetic symbols, designated variable quantities with the last letters of the Latin alphabet (x, y, z), introduced the current designation of degrees, laid the foundations of the theory of equations. In geometry, he introduced a system of rectilinear coordinates, laid the foundations of analytical geometry. In optics, he discovered the law of refraction of a light beam at the boundary of two different media. Assessing the contribution of R. Descartes to philosophy, A. Schopenhauer wrote that he "for the first time prompted the mind to stand on its own feet and taught people to use their own head, which until then had been replaced by the Bible ... and Aristotle."

Descartes, like Bacon, emphasized the need for a reform of scientific thinking. We need a philosophy that will help people in their practical affairs so that they can become masters of nature. The construction of philosophy should begin, according to Descartes, with a consideration of the method, since only having the correct method can one "achieve knowledge of everything."

Like Bacon, Descartes criticizes all prior knowledge. However, here he takes a more radical position. He suggests questioning not individual schools of thought or the teachings of ancient authorities, but all the achievements of the previous culture. “A person investigating the truth needs at least once in his life to doubt

1 The ideal of scientific character is a system of cognitive norms and requirements based on them for the results of scientific and cognitive activity. Allocate mathematical, physical, humanitarian ideals of scientific character. Each of the identified ideals of scientificity is based on a basic cognitive orientation that determines the nature of the questions asked to being, a special combination of methods, techniques and procedures for obtaining answers to these questions.

thread in all things - as far as possible. Since we are born as infants and make various judgments about sensible things before we fully take over our minds, we are distracted from true knowledge by many prejudices; obviously, we can get rid of them only if, at least once in our life, we try to doubt all those things about the reliability of which we harbor even the slightest suspicion. "

However, Descartes' principle that everything should be doubted does not raise doubt as an end, but only as a means. As Hegel writes, this principle “rather has the meaning that we must renounce all prejudices, that is, from all premises that are immediately accepted as true, and must start with thinking and only from here come to something reliable in order to gain the true beginning. " Doubt of Descartes is thus inherently methodological doubt. It acts as a doubt that destroys all (imaginary) certainty in order to find the only (actual) primary certainty. “Primary” certainty can be the cornerstone laid in the foundation of the whole structure of our knowledge.

Bacon finds the primary certainty in sensory evidence, in empirical knowledge... For Descartes, however, sensory evidence as the basis, the principle of the reliability of knowledge is unacceptable. “Everything that I have so far believed to be the most true, I have received either from the senses or through their medium. But I sometimes caught my feelings in deception, and it would be reasonable not always to strongly believe those who deceived us at least once ”.

Nor can the reliability of knowledge be based on “authorities”. The question would immediately arise where the credibility of these authorities comes from. Descartes raises the question of comprehending certainty in itself, certainty, which should be the initial prerequisite and therefore itself cannot rely on other prerequisites.

Descartes finds such certainty in the thinking I, or rather in the fact of the existence of doubt. Doubt is undoubted, because even doubting the existence of doubt, we doubt. But what is doubt? Thinking activity. If there is doubt, then there is thinking. But if there is doubt and thinking, then undoubtedly there is also a doubting and thinking self. “If we discard and declare false everything that can be doubted in any way, then it is easy to assume that there is no God, sky, body, but we cannot say that we do not exist, who think in this way. For it is unnatural to believe that what thinks does not exist. And therefore the fact expressed in words: "I think, therefore I am" ( cogito ergo sum) , is the foremost of all and the most reliable of those that will appear before anyone who philosophizes correctly ".

The fact that Descartes finds the primary certainty in the thinking self is associated in a certain sense with the development of natural science, or, more precisely, with the development of the mathematical constructions of natural science. Mathematics, in which the basis is an ideal construction (and not what this construction corresponds to in real nature), is considered a science that achieves its truths with a high degree of certainty. “We will probably not be wrong if we say that physics, astronomy, medicine and all other sciences that depend on the observation of complex things have a dubious value, but that arithmetic, geometry and other similar sciences, which talk only about the simplest and the most general and little worried about whether these things are in nature or not, contain something certain and certain. After all, both in sleep and in vigil, two plus three always give five, and a rectangle has no more than four sides. It seems impossible that such obvious truths should be suspected of being wrong. "Descartes points out here that the credibility of mathematics lies in the fact that, compared to other sciences, they depend most of all on the thinking self and least of all on "external reality."

Thus, the primary certainty, on the basis of which new knowledge can be created, must be sought in the mind. The very discretion of these primary certainties, according to Descartes, occurs through intuition ... “By intuition I mean not the shaky evidence of feelings and not the deceptive judgment of an incorrect imagination, but the understanding of a clear and attentive mind, so light and distinct that there is absolutely no doubt about what we mean, or, what is the same, certain understanding of a clear and attentive mind, which is generated by only the light of the mind ... Thus, everyone can perceive with the mind that he exists, that he thinks that the triangle is limited only by three lines, and the ball is a single surface, and the like, which are much more numerous, than most people notice, because they consider it unworthy to turn the mind to such easy things.

Further development of thought, according to Descartes, occurs as a result deduction , which Descartes calls the "movement of thought", in which there is a cohesion of intuitive truths. Thus, the path of knowledge consists in the derivation (deduction) of all truth from the previous one and all truths from the first ... The result of consistent and ramified deduction should be the construction of a system of universal knowledge, "universal science."

The above provisions of Descartes formed the basis of his method of cognition. This method involves following four rules:

1) do not take anything for granted, which is obviously not sure. Avoid any haste and prejudice and include in your judgments only that which appears to the mind so clearly and distinctly that in no way can give rise to doubt;

2) divide each problem chosen for study into as many parts as possible and necessary for its best solution (analytical rule) ;

3) arrange your thoughts in a certain order, starting with the objects of the simplest and easily recognizable, and ascend little by little, as in steps, to the knowledge of the most complex, allowing the existence of order even among those that in the natural course of things do not precede each other (synthetic rule) ;

4) make checklists so complete and reviews so comprehensive everywhere to be sure nothing is missing (enumeration rule).

If F. Bacon laid the foundations of the "physical ideal of scientific character", then R. Descartes stands at the origins "Mathematical ideal of scientific character", where such cognitive values \u200b\u200bas logical clarity, strictly deductive character, the possibility of obtaining consistent results by logical inference from the basic premises expressed in axioms are brought to the fore.

8.2.2. The problem of "innate knowledge"

The dispute around the problem of the method of scientific knowledge between the representatives of rationalism and empiricism continued in the discussion around the problem of "innate knowledge", i.e. concepts and provisions that are originally inherent in human thinking and do not depend on experience (axioms of mathematics, logic, ethics, initial philosophical principles).

In modern philosophy, the theme of innate knowledge came to the fore under the influence of Descartes' epistemology. According to Descartes, human cognitive activity is composed of three classes of ideas, the role of which, however, is not the same. One of them includes ideas received by each person from the outside as a result of continuous sensory contacts with things and phenomena. This is the idea of \u200b\u200bthe Sun that everyone has. The second kind of ideas is formed in his mind on the basis of ideas of the first kind. They can be either completely fantastic, like the idea of \u200b\u200ba chimera, or more realistic, like the idea of \u200b\u200bthe same Sun, which an astronomer forms on the basis of an external sensory idea, but more substantiated and deeply than an ordinary person. But for the process of cognition, the most important and even decisive role is played by the third type of ideas, which Descartes calls congenital ... Their distinctive features were: complete independence from external objects acting on feelings, clarity, distinctness and simplicity, indicating independence from the will. As the author of Rules for the Guidance of the Mind explains, “things we call simple are either purely intellectual, or purely material, or general... Purely intellectual are those things that are cognized by the intellect by means of some light innate to it without any participation of any bodily image. " For example, knowledge, doubt, ignorance, action of the will are perfectly clear without any bodily image. Purely material ideas should be recognized that are possible only in relation to bodies - extension, figure, movement, etc. Ideas such as existence, unity, duration are both spiritual and material ideas. All these are innate concepts. The highest of them and decisive for all cognition is the completely spiritual concept of God as an actually infinite absolute, always present in the human soul.

Along with the innate concepts, there are also innate axioms that represent the connection between the concepts of our thinking. Examples of them are such truths as “two quantities equal to the third are equal to each other”, “something cannot come from nothing”. The category of innate truths should include the position that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time (that is, the logical law of identity), as well as the original truth - "I think, therefore I exist." The number of such inborn positions, according to Descartes, is innumerable. They come to light in a wide variety of cases of scientific research, and in everyday life.

The innate nature of ideas does not mean that they are always available in the human mind as ready-made, automatically clear almost from the uterine existence of a person. In fact, congenitality means only a predisposition, a tendency to manifest these ideas in certain conditions, when they become completely clear, distinct and obvious.

D. Locke, a representative of British empiricism, criticized these provisions of R. Descartes.

John Locke (1632-1704) was born into a Puritan family that was in opposition to the Anglican Church dominant in the country. Studied at Oxford University. Remaining at the university as a teacher, he was engaged in chemistry, mineralogy, medicine. There he also gets acquainted with the philosophy of Descartes. For 19 years worked on the book "Experience on Human Understanding" , a kind of "manifesto of British empiricism"

John Locke defined the question of the origin, reliability and limits of human knowledge as one of the main tasks of his philosophy. The answer to it was to serve as a reliable foundation for all the undertakings of the human mind. Following Bacon, Locke defines experience as the basis of all knowledge. This choice was dictated, in particular, by a complete rejection of the alternative (rationalistic) position, which bound itself with the recognition of the existence of innate ideas. According to Locke, open-minded criticism of this concept did not leave it any right to exist.

Are there inborn ideas? Locke considers the concept of innate ideas untenable. Supporters of innate ideas include some theoretical and practical (moral) foundations as such. The theoretical principles include, for example, the principles of logic: "What is - that is" (the principle of identity) or: "It is impossible that the same thing was and was not" (the principle of contradiction). But, says Locke, these positions are unknown to children and those without a scientific education. That bitter is not sweet, that a rose is not a cherry, this child understands much earlier than he can understand the position: "It is impossible that one and the same thing could be and at the same time not be."

Moral positions are also not innate. Different persons and in different states may have different and even opposite moral convictions. “Where are these innate principles of justice, piety, gratitude, truth, chastity? Where is the universal recognition that assures us of the existence of such innate rules? ... And if we glance at people, what they are, we will see that in one place some feel remorse over what others are in another place show their merit. "

The concept of God is also not innate: some peoples do not have it; different ideas about God among polytheists and monotheists; even people belonging to the same religion have different ideas about God.

In refuting the concept of innate ideas, Locke proceeds from three main points:

There are no innate ideas, all knowledge is born in experience and from experience;

The “soul” (or mind) of a person at birth is “tabula rasa” (“blank slate”);

There is nothing in the mind that did not exist before in sensations, in feelings.

“Suppose that the soul is, so to speak, white paper, without any features and ideas. But how is it filled with them? Where does she get all the material of reasoning and knowledge? To this I answer in one word: from experience. All our knowledge is contained in experience, from it, in the end, it comes. " Locke understands experience as an individual process. Experience is everything that a person directly deals with throughout his life. Reasonable ability is formed in the process of life experience and thanks to the own efforts of each individual.

Locke understands experience, first of all, as the impact of objects of the surrounding world on us, our sensory organs. Therefore, for him, sensation is the basis of all knowledge. However, in accordance with one of his main theses about the need to study the abilities and boundaries of human cognition, he also pays attention to the study of the process of cognition itself, to the activity of thought (soul). The experience that we acquire in this process, he defines as "internal" in contrast to the experience gained through the perception of the sensory world. Ideas that have arisen on the basis of external experience (i.e., mediated by sensory perceptions), he calls sensory ( sensations ); ideas that take their origin from inner experience, he defines as arising "Reflections" .

However, experience - both external and internal - directly leads only to the emergence simple ideas ... In order for our thought (soul) to receive general ideas, it is necessary reflection ... Reflection, in Locke's understanding, is a process in which from simple ideas (obtained on the basis of external and internal experience) arise complex ideas that cannot appear directly on the basis of feelings or reflection. “Sensations first introduce individual ideas and fill in an empty space with them; and as the mind gradually becomes familiar with some of them, they are placed in memory along with the names given to them. "

Complex ideas appear, according to Locke, as follows.

♦ Direct summation of ideas. So, the idea "apple" is the result of the addition of several simpler ideas: "color", "taste", "shape", "smell", etc.

♦ Simple ideas are compared, compared, relations are established between them. This is how ideas appear: "cause", "difference", "identity", etc.

♦ Generalization. It happens as follows. Single objects of a certain class are broken down into simple properties; those that are repeated are highlighted, and non-repeating ones are discarded; then the repeating ones are summed up, which gives a complex general idea. So, "if from the complex ideas denoted by the words" man "and" horse ", we exclude only the features by which they differ, retain only what they agree on, form a new complex idea different from others and give it a name" animal ", we get a more general term embracing various other creatures together with a person." By using this generalization procedure, all higher levels are made less meaningful.

According to Locke, everything he said should confirm his main thesis: "There is nothing in the mind that would not have been in feelings before" ... The mind is only capable of combining ideas, but regardless of its strength, it is unable to either destroy or invent new ("simple") ideas.

However, Locke does not seem to notice one obvious thing. Ascribing to the mind the constructive ability to create complex ideas through the operations of summation, generalization, abstraction, etc., he does not question the origin of this ability. Since this ability cannot be obtained through experience, then, obviously, this ability is innate to the human mind. Therefore, innate knowledge is. This is what G. Leibniz had in mind when, arguing with Locke, he wrote: "There is nothing in the mind that would not be in the senses, except the mind itself."

A very important element of Locke's views is his concept of "primary" and "secondary" qualities. The qualities "which are completely inseparable from the body", Locke calls " initial, or primary... they give rise to simple ideas in us, that is, density, extension, form, movement or rest and number. " Primary qualities "really exist" in the bodies themselves, they are inherent in all and always. The primary qualities are perceived by various senses in a coordinated and pictorially accurate manner. The simple ideas of hardness, extension, shape, movement, number are an accurate reflection of the properties inherent in the bodies themselves.

The situation is different with ideas secondary qualities - color, sound, smell, taste, warmth, cold, pain, etc. It cannot be said with complete certainty that they reflect in themselves the properties of external bodies as they exist outside of us.

Locke sees different approaches to solving the problem of the relation of ideas of secondary qualities to the properties of external bodies. First, the statement is made that the secondary qualities are "imaginary", they are states of the subject himself. So, for example, we can say that there is no objective bitterness in quinine, it is just the experience of the subject. Secondly, there is the opposite approach, within which it is argued that the ideas of secondary qualities are an exact likeness of qualities in bodies outside of us. Thirdly, we can assume that “in the bodies themselves, there is nothing like these our ideas. In bodies ... there is only the ability to produce these sensations in us. " Locke considers the last option to be the closest to the truth. He says that a special structure of combinations of primary qualities evokes ideas of secondary qualities in a person's mind. These ideas arise in the mind of the subject only under the appropriate conditions of perception. As a result, Locke argues that the ideas of primary qualities are adequate to the very properties of things, and secondary ones are not. "The ideas evoked in us by secondary qualities do not at all resemble them." But the ideas of secondary qualities have a basis in things, an objective basis. “What is sweet, blue or warm in an idea, then in the bodies themselves ... there is only a certain volume, shape and movement of imperceptible particles. The violet from the jolt of such imperceptible particles of matter ... evokes in our mind the ideas of blue and the pleasant smell of this flower. "

Locke's doctrine of primary and secondary qualities marked, first, the rise of the theory of knowledge, which recognizes such a distinction, above the point of view of naive realism; second, the creation of an epistemological concept in a heuristic respect is very valuable for mathematized natural science, since she justified and encouraged his claims. It is no coincidence that Galileo and Boyle adhered to this idea, who understood that the basis of an objective, scientific study of objects and natural phenomena should be based on those qualities to which one can apply measure and number, and those qualities to which it is not possible to apply them should be try to reduce to the first. Subsequent advances in optics and acoustics fully justified this approach.

At the same time, the idea of \u200b\u200bprimary and secondary qualities was one of the prerequisites for the emergence of such a kind of empiricism as subjective idealism, presented in modern times by the teachings of D. Berkeley and D. Hume, whose views I. Kant at one time regarded as "Scandal for philosophy" .

F. BECON

(Extracts)

There are four kinds of idols that plague people's minds. In order to study them, we will give them names. Let's call the first kind the idols of the clan, the second - the idols of the cave, the third - the idols of the square and the fourth - the idols of the theater ...

Idols of the kind find a basis in the very nature of man ... for it is false to assert that the feelings of man are the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions of both the feeling and the mind rest on the analogy of man, and not the analogy of the world. The human mind is likened to an uneven mirror, which, mixing its nature with the nature of things, reflects things in a twisted and disfigured form.

Idols of the cave the essence of the delusion of the individual. After all, in addition to the mistakes inherent in the human race, each has its own special cave, which weakens and distorts the light of nature. This happens either from the special innate properties of each, or from upbringing and conversations with others, or from reading books and from the authorities whom one bows to, or due to the difference in impressions, depending on whether their souls are biased and predisposed, or souls cold-blooded and calm, or for other reasons ... That is why Heraclitus correctly said that people seek knowledge in small worlds, and not in the big, or in the general, world.

There are also idols that occur, as it were, due to the mutual connection and community of people. We call these idols, having in mind the communication and fellowship of people that give rise to them, idols of the square , people are united by speech. Words are established according to the understanding of the crowd. Therefore, the bad and absurd establishment of words is amazingly besieging the mind.

The definitions and explanations with which learned people are accustomed to arm themselves and protect themselves do not help the cause in any way. Words directly violate the mind, confuse everything and lead to empty and countless arguments and interpretations.

Finally, there are idols who have taken over the souls of people from different tenets of philosophy, as well as from the perverse laws of evidence. We call them idols of the theater, for we believe that, how many adopted or invented philosophical systems, so many comedies have been staged and played, representing fictional and artificial worlds ... At the same time, we mean here not only general philosophical teachings, but also numerous principles and axioms of sciences, which received strength as a result of tradition, faith and carelessness ...

The human mind is not dry light, it is held together by will and passions, and this gives rise to what everyone desires in science. A person rather believes in the truth of what he prefers ... In an infinite number of ways, sometimes imperceptible, passions stain and spoil the mind.

But to the greatest extent, the confusion and delusion of the human mind comes from inertia, inconsistency and deception of the senses, for that which excites feelings is preferred to that which does not immediately excite feelings, even if this latter was better. Therefore, contemplation stops when the gaze stops, so that the observation of invisible things turns out to be insufficient or absent altogether ...

The human mind by its nature is directed towards the abstract and the fluid thinks as constant. But it is better to cut nature into pieces than to abstract. This was done by the school of Democritus, which penetrated nature deeper than others. It is necessary to study more matter, its internal state and change of state, pure action and the law of action or movement, for forms are the invention of the human soul, unless these laws of action are called forms ...

Some minds are inclined to worship antiquity, others are carried away by the love of novelty. But few can observe such a measure that they do not reject what is justly established by the ancients, and do not neglect what is rightly proposed by the new. This causes great damage to philosophy and sciences, for it is rather a consequence of the fascination with the ancients and the new, and not judgments about them. The truth must be sought not in the luck of any time, which is impermanent, but in the light of the experience of nature, which is eternal.

Therefore, you need to give up these aspirations and watch how they would not subdue the mind ...

Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, accomplishes and understands as much as he has grasped in its order by deed or reflection, and from above he does not know and cannot.

Neither the bare hand nor the mind left to itself has much power. The work is accomplished with tools and aids, which the mind needs no less than the hand. And as the tools of the hand give or direct movement, so the tools of the mind give or warn the mind.

Human knowledge and power coincide because ignorance of the cause makes it difficult to act. Nature is conquered only by submission to her, and that which in contemplation appears to be the cause, in action appears to be the rule.

The subtlety of nature is many times greater than the subtlety of feelings and reason, so that all these beautiful contemplations, reflections, interpretations are a meaningless thing; only there is no one who would see it.

The logic, which is now used, rather serves to strengthen and preserve delusions, which have their basis in generally accepted concepts, than to find a person. Therefore, it is more harmful than useful.

Syllogisms consist of sentences, sentences of words, and words are signs of concepts. Therefore, if the concepts themselves, constituting the basis of everything, are confused and thoughtlessly distracted from things, then there is nothing solid in what is built on them. Therefore, the only hope is in true induction.

Neither logic nor physics has anything sound in concepts. “Substance”, “quality”, “action”, “suffering”, even “being” are not good concepts; even less than that - concepts: “heavy”, “light”, “thick”, “rarefied”, “wet”, dry ”,“ generation ”,“ decomposition ”,“ attraction ”,“ repulsion ”,“ element ”,“ matter ”,“ form ”and others of the same kind. They are all fictional and ill-defined.

What is still open to the sciences, almost entirely belongs to the field of ordinary concepts. In order to penetrate into the depths and into the distance of nature, it is necessary in a more correct and careful way to distract from things both concepts and axioms, and in general, a better and more reliable work of reason is needed.

In no way can the axioms established by reasoning be valid for the discovery of new cases, for "the subtlety of nature is many times greater than the subtlety of reasoning. But the axioms, properly abstracted from particulars, in turn, easily indicate and define new in this way make the sciences work.

The axioms that are now used come from meager and simple experience and the few particulars that are commonly encountered, and almost correspond to these facts and their scope. Therefore, there is nothing to be surprised if these axioms do not lead to new particulars. If, contrary to expectations, an example is revealed that was not previously known, the axiom is saved through some whimsical distinction, while it would be truer to correct the axiom itself.

The knowledge that we usually apply in the study of nature, we will call for educational purposes anticipation of nature, because it is hasty and immature. But the knowledge that we properly extract from things we will call interpretation of nature.

The best of all evidence is experience ... The way people use experience now is blind and unreasonable. And because they wander and wander without any right path and are guided only by those things that come across, they turn to many things, but move little forward. Even if they are taken for experiments more thoughtfully, with greater constancy and diligence, they invest their work in any one experience, for example, Hilbert — in a magnet, alchemists — in gold. This way of acting is both ignorant and helpless ...

On the first day of creation, God created only light, giving this work the whole day and did not create anything material on that day. In the same way, first of all, one must derive the discovery of true causes and axioms from diverse experience, and must seek luminous, not fruitful experiences. Correctly discovered and established axioms do not arm practice superficially, but deeply and entail numerous series of practical applications ...

In all sciences we meet the same common trick that the creators of any science turn the impotence of their science into slander against nature. And what is unattainable for their science, they, on the basis of the same science, declare impossible in nature itself ...

Those who studied the sciences were either empiricists or dogmatists. Empiricists, like the ant, only collect and are content with the collected. Rationalists, like a spider, make a web of themselves. The bee, on the other hand, chooses the middle way: it extracts material from garden and field flowers, but disposes and changes it according to its skill. The true business of philosophy does not differ from this either.For it does not rely solely or on predominantly on the powers of the mind and does not deposit intact material in the mind, extracted from natural history and from mechanical experiments, but changes it and processes it in the mind. So, good hope should be placed on a closer and more indestructible (which has not yet happened) union of these abilities — experience and reason.

One should not, nevertheless, allow the mind to jump from particulars to distant and almost most general axioms (what are the so-called principles of sciences and things) and, by their unshakable truth, would test and establish the middle axioms. This has been the case until now: the mind is inclined to this not only by natural impulse, but also because it has long been accustomed to this by proofs through syllogism. For the sciences, we should expect good only when we ascend the true ladder, along continuous, not intermittent steps - from particulars to lesser axioms and then to middle ones, one higher than the other, and finally to the most general ones. For the lowest axioms differ little from bare experience. The highest and most general (which we have) are speculative and abstract, and there is nothing solid in them. (The middle axioms are true, solid and vital, human affairs and destinies depend on them. And above them, finally, are the most general axioms - not abstract, but correctly limited by these average axioms.

Therefore, the human mind must be given not wings, but rather lead and gravity, so that they restrain every jump and flight ...

To construct axioms, a another form of induction than the one used so far. This form must be applied not only to the discovery and testing of what is called the beginnings, but even to the lesser and middle ones, and, finally, to all the axioms. Induction, which is accomplished by a simple enumeration, is a childish thing: it gives shaky conclusions and is endangered by conflicting particulars, making decisions mostly on the basis of fewer facts than it should, and moreover only those that are available. Induction, on the other hand, which will be useful for the discovery and proof of the arts and sciences, must divide nature through proper distinctions and exclusions. And then, after enough negative judgments, she should conclude positive. This has not yet been accomplished ... One should use the help of this induction not only for the discovery of axioms, but also for the definition of concepts. This induction undoubtedly contains the greatest hope..

Rene Descartes

(Extracts)

Foolish animals, which should only care about their bodies, are constantly and are busy only looking for food for it; for a person, the main part of which is the mind, in the first place should be concern for obtaining his true food - wisdom. I am firmly convinced that many would not fail to do this, if only they hoped to be in time and knew how to do it ...

...The highest good, as shows, even besides the light of faith, one natural mind, there is nothing else but the knowledge of the truth by its root causes, that is, wisdom; the latter is philosophy. Since all this is quite true, it is not difficult to be convinced of this, as long as everything is correctly derived. But since this belief is contradicted by experience showing that people who are most engaged in philosophy are often less wise and do not use their reason as well as those who have never devoted themselves to this occupation, I would like here to briefly outline what those the sciences that we now possess, and what level of wisdom these sciences reach. First stage contains only those concepts that, thanks to their own light, are so clear that they can be acquired without reflection . Second stage embraces everything that gives us sensory experience. The third is what communication with other people teaches ... You can attach here, in fourth place, reading books, certainly not all, but mainly those written by people capable of giving us good instructions; it's like a kind of communication with their creators. All the wisdom usually possessed is acquired, in my opinion, in these four ways. I do not include divine revelation here, for it does not gradually, but at once raise us to an infallible faith ...

When studying the nature of different minds, I noticed that there are hardly any people so stupid and stupid who would not be able to acquire good opinions or rise to higher knowledge, if only they were directed along the proper path. This can be proved as follows: if the beginnings are clear and nothing can be deduced from anything other than through the most obvious reasoning, then no one is deprived of reason enough not to understand the consequences that follow from this ...

In order for the purpose that I had when publishing this book to be correctly understood, I would like to indicate here the order that, as it seems to me, should be followed for my own enlightenment. Firstly, the one who owns only ordinary and imperfect knowledge, which can be acquired through the four above-mentioned methods, must first of all draw up moral rules for himself, sufficient for leadership in everyday affairs, for this does not tolerate delay and our first concern should be the right life. ... Then you need to do logic, but not the one that is taught in schools ...

I know that many centuries may pass before all the truths that can be extracted from these principles will be deduced, since the truths that must be found depend to a large extent on individual experiences; the latter are never done by accident, but must be sought by discerning people with care and expense. After all, it does not always happen that those who are able to carry out experiments correctly will acquire the opportunity to do so; and also many of those who stand out for such abilities form an unfavorable idea of \u200b\u200bphilosophy in general due to the shortcomings of the philosophy that has been in use until now - on this basis they will not try to find a better one. But whoever finally grasps the difference between my principles and the principles of others, as well as what series of truths can be extracted from this, they will be convinced of how important these principles are in the search for truth and to what high level of wisdom, to what perfection of life, to what bliss can bring us these beginnings. I dare to believe that there will be no one who would not go to meet such a useful occupation for him, or at least who would not sympathize and would not wish with all his might to help the people who work fruitfully on it. I wish our descendants to see a happy ending.

When I was younger, I studied a little from the field of philosophy - logic, and from mathematics - geometric analysis and algebra - these three arts, or sciences, which, it would seem, should provide something for the implementation of my intention. But, studying them, I noticed that in logic her syllogisms and most of her other teachings
rather, they help explain to others what we know, or even,
as in the art of Llull, it is stupid to talk about what you do not know, instead of studying it. And although logic does contain many very correct and good prescriptions, however, so many others - either harmful or unnecessary - are mixed in with them that it is almost as difficult to separate them as to discern Diana or Minerva in an unfinished block of marble ... Likewise how an abundance of laws often justifies vices - why government order is much better when laws are few but strictly enforced - and how, instead of a large number the rules that form the logic, I found it sufficient to adhere firmly and unwaveringly to the following four.

The first - never take for true anything that I would not have known as such with obviousness, in other words, carefully and grudge recklessness and prejudice and include in my judgment only that which seems to my mind so clearly and so clearly that it gives me no reason question them.

Second - to divide each of the difficulties I investigate into as many parts as possible and necessary to better overcome them.

Third - to adhere to a certain order of thinking, starting with the objects of the simplest and most easily cognized and gradually going up to the knowledge of the most complex, assuming order even where the objects of thought are not given at all in their natural connection.

And the last - always draw up lists so complete and reviews so general that there is confidence in the absence of omissions.

Long chains of arguments, completely simple and accessible, which geometers are in the habit of using in their most difficult proofs, prompted me to think that everything accessible to human knowledge, however, follows from one another. Thus, being careful not to accept as true what is not, and always observing the proper order in conclusions, one can make sure that there is nothing so distant that cannot be achieved, nor so secret that cannot be discovered. It didn't take much effort for me to find where to start, since I already knew that I had to start with the simplest and most understandable; Considering that among all those who previously investigated truth in sciences, only mathematicians were able to find some proofs, that is, to present undeniable and obvious arguments, I no longer doubted that it was necessary to start with those they investigated.

Since the senses do not deceive, I have found it necessary to admit that the notes of not a single thing, which would be such as it appears to us; and since there are people who make mistakes even in the simplest questions of geometry and admit paralogism in them, I, considering myself capable of making mistakes no less than others, discarded all the false arguments that I had previously taken as proofs. Finally, considering that any idea that we have in the waking state can appear to us in a dream, without being reality, I decided to imagine that everything that ever came to my mind is no more true than the visions of my words. ... But I immediately noticed that at the same time, when I was inclined to think about the illusory nature of everything in the world, it was necessary that I myself, thus reasoning, should really exist. And noticing that the truth I think, therefore I exist so firm and true that the most extravagant assumptions of skeptics cannot shake it, I concluded that I can safely accept it as the first principle of the philosophy I was looking for. Then, carefully examining what I myself am, I could imagine that I have no body, that there is no world, no place where I would be, but I could not imagine that as a result of this I do not exist, on the contrary , from the fact that I doubted the truth of other objects, it clearly and undoubtedly followed that I exist. And if I stopped thinking, then, even if everything else that I ever imagined was true, there was still no basis for the conclusion that I exist. From this I learned that I am a substance, the whole essence or nature of which consists in thinking and which for its existence does not need any place and does not hang from any material thing. Thus, my I, the soul, which makes me what I am, completely different from the body and it is easier to know than the body, and even if it did not even exist, it would not cease to be what it is.

Then I considered what is generally required for a proposition to be true and certain; for having found one proposition to be reliably true, I should also have known what that certainty was. And noticing that in the truth of the situation I think, therefore I exist, the only clear idea convinces me that for thinking it is necessary to exist, I concluded that it is possible to take for general rule the following: everything we represent quite clearly and distinctly is true. However, some difficulty lies in correctly distinguishing what exactly we are able to represent quite clearly.

As a result, thinking about that since I doubt, it means that my being is not completely perfect, for I quite clearly discerned that full comprehension is something more than doubt, I began to look for where I acquired the ability to think. About something more perfect than myself, and I understood with all obviousness that

it must come from something truly superior in nature. As for the thoughts about many other things that are outside of me - about the sky, the Earth, light, warmth and a thousand others, I was not so difficult to answer where they came from. For having noticed that in my thoughts about them there is nothing that would put them above me, I could think that if they are true, then it depends on my nature, since it is endowed with certain perfections; if they are false, then I have them from being, that is, they are in me, because I lack something. But this cannot apply to the idea of \u200b\u200ba being more perfect than myself: it is clearly impossible to get it out of nothing. Since it is unacceptable to admit that the more perfect was a consequence of the less perfect, as well as to assume the emergence of any thing from nothing, I could not create it myself. Thus, it remained to admit that this idea was put into me by those whose nature is more perfect than mine and who combines in themselves all the perfections available to my imagination - in a word, God.

This word - true - in its own sense, it means the correspondence of thought to an object, but when applied to things that are beyond the reach of thought, it only means that these things can serve as objects of true thoughts - whether ours or God; however, we cannot give any logical definition to help us understand the nature of truth.

there are tasks in the teaching materials on page 14, 12 of them must be completed one of the tasks
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List of practical tasks for assessing the degree of mastery of competencies:

Exercise 1.

Define the specifics of the concepts "subject" and "object" of cognition?

Are there any fundamental differences between agnosticism, relativism and skepticism?

What is the specificity of cognitive activity? How do ideal and material correlate in practice?

What conclusions follow from the absolutization of truth or exaggeration of the moment of relativity in it?

Compare the concepts of "truth", "lie", "error", "opinion", "faith".

Describe the concept of truth from the point of view of conventionalism, pragmatism, dialectical materialism.

Can an objectively true value become false over time? If so, please provide examples to support this.

There is a well-known theory of knowledge. Its essence is expressed in the following words: "... after all, to seek and to know is exactly what it means to remember ... But to find knowledge in oneself is what it means to remember, isn't it?"

a) What is the name of this theory?

c) What is the meaning of "remembering"?

d) What is common between this theory and methods of scientific search?

Task 2.

Compare Plato's and Aristotle's ideas about the best society. Rate them: are they real or utopian? Are there features of historical limitation in them, or, on the contrary, foreshadowing of the future? Are they humane or inhuman? are there any ideas that could be taken into account by modern politicians?

Based on the dialectical ideas of Heraclitus, explain the following statements:

a) "The fairest of the monkeys is ugly when compared with the human race."

b) "Sea water is both pure and dirtiest at the same time: it is drink and salvation for fish, but death and poison for people."

- “Man is the measure of all things ...” - what philosophical concept does this statement mean?

Is it possible to identify the categories of being and matter, being and thinking? What kind of philosophical positions can you end up with?

What is the specificity of human existence?

Reveal the internal contradictions of natural, spiritual and social life.

Which ancient philosopher belongs to the statement: “there is, but there is no non-being”? Explain its meaning. What qualities does such being have?

- "Language is the house of being." Which contemporary Western philosopher has expressed this idea? Explain the connection between word, thought and being.

What is the opposite of the category of being in philosophy? Give examples from the history of philosophy.

Read the parable.

A professor at one of the Tokyo universities decided to take some Zen Buddhism lessons from a famous Master. Arriving at his home, he immediately began to talk about why he wants to take lessons and how much he had already read literature on this topic. The master invited him to go into the house and offered him tea. The professor continued to speak, listing the books he had read about Zen. The master began to pour tea into the guest's cup, when the cup was full to the brim and tea began to pour out of it, the professor exclaimed:

Master, what are you doing, the cup is already full and the water is overflowing!

Unfortunately, your consciousness is very similar to this cup, - answered the Master. - It is filled with all kinds of information, and any new knowledge will overflow. Come next time - with an empty cup.

Comment on this Zen Buddhist parable.

What are the meanings of this parable?

Why, according to the Master, is the "overflowing" consciousness not ready for knowledge?

What knowledge, from the point of view of ancient Indian, Buddhist philosophy, is considered superfluous, unnecessary? Why?

How does Buddhism propose to prepare the mind for the perception of truth? What is the specificity of the perception of reality in the Buddhist worldview?

Compare the ideas about the purpose of philosophy in the ancient philosophy of India, China and Greece. What common? What are the differences?

Task 3.

What idea is contained in the following reasoning of J. Bruno: “Since the Universe is infinite and motionless, there is no need to look for its engine ... The endless worlds contained in it, such as earths, lights and other types of bodies, called stars, all move due to the inner principle, which is their own soul ... and as a result it is in vain to seek out their external motive. "

Read the statement: "The plurality of being cannot occur without number. Subtract the number, and there will be no order, proportion, harmony, and even the plurality of being ... The unit is the beginning of every number, since it is the minimum; it is the end of every number, since it is - maximum. It is, therefore, absolute unity; nothing opposes it; it is absolute maximality: the all-good God ... "

a) Which of the philosophers of the Renaissance: Leonardo da Vinci, Pomponazzi, Lorenzo Valla, Bruno, Nikolai Kuzansky - the author of the statement?

b) What is the principle of the study of being embedded in this statement?

c) How is being understood in the above passage?

Read the statement: “When I deny the existence of sensible things outside the mind, I do not mean my mind, in particular, but all minds. It is clear that these things have an existence external to my soul, since I find them independent in experience Therefore, there is some other soul in which they exist in the intervals between the moments of my perception of them. "

Who owns this passage? Explain philosophical position the author.

Task 4.

- "For the sciences, we should expect good only when we ascend along the true ladder, along continuous, not intermittent steps - from particulars to lesser axioms and then to intermediate ones, one higher than the other, and, finally, to the most general ones. the lowest axioms differ little from naked experience, while the highest and most general ones (which we have) are speculative and abstract, and there is nothing solid in them. The middle axioms are true, firm and vital, human affairs and destinies depend on them. Finally, they are the most general axioms - not abstract, but correctly limited by these average axioms.

Therefore, the human mind should not be given wings, but rather lead and gravity, so that they hold back every jump and flight ... "

a) What method of cognition in question?

b) What steps should a person go through in the process of cognition?

French philosopher of the 17th century. K. Helvetius compared the process of cognition with the judicial process: five senses are five witnesses, only they can give the truth. His opponents, however, objected to him, claiming that he had forgotten the judge.

a) What did the opponents mean by the judge?

b) What gnoseological position is Helvetius?

c) What is the advantage of such a position? What is its one-sidedness?

Task 5.

Read §1 of I. Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" and answer the following questions:

What is “pure knowledge” according to Kant? Name its components. How should they be distinguished according to Kant? Why is this distinction necessary? Give examples of both knowledge.

What was the criticism of pure experience for Kant? Explain the entire expression as well as the meaning of the underlined words. Can Kant's teaching be called "transcendental philosophy"? Explain this phrase. What is this philosophy about?

What are Kant's antinomies? What is their meaning? Give examples of such antinomies.

What is Kant's categorical imperative? How imperative and demand for debt relate. Offer your imperative in the spirit of Kant. From Kant's point of view, will a merchant whose honesty is conditioned by his interest be moral? What law should a person be guided by?

Can, according to Kant, a moral requirement be a priori? Please provide some judgments on this score.

What is Kant's practical imperative? Give its formula and prove its truth. What research method did you use?

Task 6.

Compare the following two statements by the Russian philosopher N.A. Berdyaeva:

“Technique is the discovery of the strength of man, his royal position in the world. It testifies to human creativity and ingenuity and should be called upon by value and goodness. " “In the world of technology, man ceases to live leaning against the ground, surrounded by plants and animals. He lives in a new metallic reality, breathes in a different, poisonous air. The machine has a destructive effect on the soul ... Modern collectives are not organic, but mechanical ... Technology rationalizes human life, but this rationalization has irrational consequences. "

a) What worries the thinker who praised human freedom, which made it possible to create the world of machines?

b) What does “irrational consequences” of rational human activity mean? What is their danger?

Do you agree with the position of S.L. Frank about the difference between faith and unbelief?

"The difference between faith and unbelief is not a difference between two opposite judgments in content: it is only a difference between a wider and narrower horizon. A believer differs from an unbeliever not in the same way that a person who sees white is different from a person who is on the same in a place he sees black; he differs in the same way as a person with sharp eyesight - from a short-sighted person or a musical person from a non-musical one. "

Why, from the point of view of N.A. Berdyaeva, freedom of conscience and communism are incompatible: "Freedom of conscience - and above all of religious conscience - presupposes that there is a spiritual principle in the individual that does not depend on society. Of course, communism does not recognize this ... In communism, on a materialistic basis, suppression of the individual is inevitable. man is seen as a brick necessary for building a communist society, he is only a means ... "

Task 7.

What kind of argumentation does Schopenhauer use to explain matter and its attributes: "But time and space, each in itself, can be contemplatively imagined without matter, matter cannot be imagined without them" (A. Schopenhauer).

Please comment on this definition of truth.

"What we call the world or reality, meaning by this something external, objective, existing independently of our experience or knowledge, is in fact a picture of the world, or in phenomenal terms, a construction from the data of experience." The scheme "world - experience - picture of the world" should be replaced by the scheme "experience - picture of the world - world" (E. Husserl).

a) What is this point of view called?

b) What are the roots of this view?

Read the snippet and answer the questions. “Human consciousness has, for the most part, an intellectual character, but it also could and should, apparently, be intuitive. Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness. Intuition goes in the direction of life itself, intellect ... is subordinated to the movement of matter. For the perfection of mankind, it would be necessary that both of these forms of cognitive activity were one ... In reality, ... intuition is entirely sacrificed in favor of the intellect ... True, intuition has also been preserved, but vague, fleeting. But philosophy must master these fleeting intuitions, support them, then expand and harmonize them with each other, ... for intuition represents the very essence of our spirit, the unity of our spiritual life. "

a) What, according to Bergson, is the advantage of intuition over intellect?

b) Is there a contrast between intuition and intellect in the real process of cognition?

c) How do intuition and intellect really correlate in cognition? Compare the point of view of Bergson and dialectical materialism.

Task 8.

Correlate the concepts of psyche and consciousness. Can they be identified?

All matter reflects. All matter senses. Are these judgments equivalent?

“The brain secretes thought, just as the liver secretes bile. The brain is material, the liver is material, bile is material, which means that thought must also be material. " Give a critical analysis of this statement.

Compare the definitions of consciousness in psychology, physiology, cybernetics and philosophy. What is the specificity of the philosophical approach?

What is the essential difference between reflection processes in living and inanimate nature? Arrange, in ascending order of difficulty, the following forms of reflection: sensitivity, psyche, consciousness, thinking, irritability, sensation.

Is labor the main reason for the emergence of thinking in humans? What other concepts of the genesis of consciousness do you know?

Thought does not exist outside the language shell. Give a philosophical analysis of this judgment.

Can creativity be considered the main difference between human consciousness and machine intelligence? Do you agree with the statement of A. Einstein that a machine will be able to solve any problem, but will never be able to pose at least one.

Task 9.

Expand the essence of the post-non-classical stage in the development of science and philosophy.

Indicate the main reasons for the formation of the postmodern worldview.

What philosophical meaning ideas of self-organization?

What was the meaning of the concepts of order and chaos in ancient Greek philosophy?

Expand the principles of synergy.

Task 10.

Give a philosophical analysis of the following statements about freedom:

a) “Freedom means the absence of resistance (by resistance I mean external obstacles to movement) ... From the use of the words“ free will ”one can draw a conclusion not about free will, desire or inclination, but only about the freedom of a person, which consists in the fact that he does not encounter obstacles to the accomplishment of what his will, desires or inclinations lead him to ”. (T. Hobbes)

b) Freedom comes with man ... It is the being of man ... The individual is completely and always free. " (J.-P. Sartre)

c) "Freedom is a cognized necessity." (B. Spinoza)

The French philosopher and writer A. Camus wrote in the book "The Rebellious Man" that ideologicalism leads to immorality. In his opinion, it may be worth giving your life for an individual person, but not for an idea. People dying for an idea, according to A. Camus, should not command respect in the 20th century.

Do you agree with this point of view? If not, why not?

Why can't an abstract individual be the starting point for characterizing a person? Does the projection of a person onto the system public relations considering a person as a person?

“Feuerbach reduces the religious essence to the human essence. But the essence of a person is not an abstract inherent in a separate individual. In reality, it is the totality of all social relations ...

... Feuerbach does not see ... that the abstract individual subject to his analysis actually belongs to a certain social form. "

Task 11.

- "If you choose between Faust and Prometheus, I prefer Prometheus" - this maxim belongs to O. Balzac. Prometheus, who, according to legend, discovered the secret of fire to man, became a symbol of the technical and scientific achievements of civilization. Faust was concerned with the problem of the meaning of earthly existence and the search for human happiness. How would you solve this dilemma? Give reasons for your decision.

In the book "Being and Nothingness" J.-P. Sartre says: "It is absurd that we were born, it is absurd that we will die." Compare this judgment with the statement of the outstanding physicist E. Schrödinger: “Where did I come from and where am I going? This is the great substantive question that is the same for all of us. Science has no answer to this question. "

a) What unites J.-P. Sartre and E. Schrödinger?

b) How to answer the questions posed by E. Schrödinger from a philosophical standpoint?

The Russian philosopher N. Berdyaev notes that the whole tragedy of human life comes from the collision of the finite and the infinite, the temporary and the eternal, from the discrepancy between man, as a spiritual being, and man, as a natural being living in the natural world. What is the fate of a person? What is the meaning of life?

Read the article by S.L. Frank The meaning of life // Questions of philosophy. - 1990. - No. 6. - P.68

How is evil overcome?

What facts of life initiate the question about the meaning of life?

What are the features of the Russian mentality when considering the question of the meaning of life?

What needs to be done to make life meaningful?

What are the conditions for the possibility of meaning in life?

Why should a person be free to achieve the meaning of life?

In what types of "comprehension" of life is the search for the meaning of life realized?

How is the path to the meaning of life realized through worldly and spiritual doing?

Task 12.

What concepts do the supporters of postmodernism use?

Describe the new type of thinking modeled by Gilles Deleuze in The Logic of Sense.

What is the essence of "surface art" and its analog - humor - in the culture of the 20th century?

What is simulacrum and simulation?

Get acquainted with excerpts from the book "The Logic of Sense" by the famous French postmodernist J. Deleuze.

“Meaning is a non-existent entity.

Becoming does not tolerate any division or distinction between before and after, past and future. The essence of becoming is movement, stretching in two senses-directions at once. Common sense claims that all things have a clearly defined meaning; but the essence of the paradox is the affirmation of two meanings at the same time.

The paradox of pure becoming with its ability to elude the present is the paradox of infinite identity: the infinite identity of both meanings at once - the future and the past, the day before and the day after, more and less, excess and lack, active and passive, cause and effect.

Unlimited becoming becomes an ideal and incorporeal event.

Pure becoming, infinity is the substance of the simulacrum, since it avoids the influence of the Idea and jeopardizes both models and copies at the same time.

The event is meaning as such.

Events - like crystals - become and grow only from borders or at borders. "

Give answers to questions.

What is a simulacrum as explained by Deleuze?

In what conditions does a simulacrum arise?

What is the reason for the spread of numerous simulacra in the culture of the twentieth century?

What are the consequences (positive and negative) of the spread of simulacra in culture?

Those who studied the sciences were either empiricists or dogmatists. Empiricists, like the ant, only collect and are content with the collected. Rationalists, like a spider, make a web of themselves. The bee, on the other hand, chooses the middle way: it extracts material from garden and field flowers, but disposes and changes it according to its skill. The true business of philosophy does not differ from this either. For it is not based solely or predominantly on the forces of the mind and does not deposit intact material into consciousness that is extracted from natural history and from mechanical experiments, but changes it and processes it in the mind. So, good hope should be placed on a closer and more indestructible (which has not yet happened) union of these abilities - experience and reason ...

One should not, nevertheless, allow the mind to jump from particulars to distant and almost most general axioms (what are the so-called principles of sciences and things) and, by their unshakable truth, would test and establish middle axioms. It has been so until now: the mind is inclined to this not only by natural impulse, but also because it has long been accustomed to this by proofs through syllogism. For the sciences, however, good should be expected only when we ascend the true ladder, along continuous, not intermittent steps - from particulars to lesser axioms and then to intermediate ones, one above the other, and finally to the most general ones. For the lowest axioms differ little from bare experience. The highest and most general axioms (which we have) are speculative and abstract, and there is nothing solid in them. Average axioms are true, solid and vital, human affairs and destinies depend on them. And above them, finally, are located the most general axioms - not abstract, but correctly bounded by these average axioms.

Therefore, the human mind must be given not wings, but rather lead and gravity, so that they restrain every jump and flight ...

For the construction of axioms, a different form of induction must be invented than the one that has been used so far. This form should be applied not only to the discovery and testing of what is called the beginnings, but even to the lesser and middle ones, and, finally, to all the axioms. Induction, which is accomplished by simple enumeration, is a childish thing: it gives shaky conclusions and is endangered by conflicting particulars, making decisions mostly on the basis of fewer facts than it should, and moreover only those that are available. Induction, on the other hand, which will be useful for the discovery and proof of the arts and sciences, must divide nature through appropriate distinctions and exclusions. And then after enough negative judgments, she should conclude positive. This has not yet been accomplished ... But the help of this induction should be used not only for the discovery of axioms, but also for the definition of concepts. This induction undoubtedly contains the greatest hope.

R. Descartes. The beginning of philosophy

Letter from the author to the French translator "The Origin of Philosophy", which is appropriate here as a preface. ... First of all, I would like to find out what philosophy is, starting with the most ordinary, namely, that the word "philosophy" means engaging in wisdom and that wisdom means not only prudence in business, but also perfect knowledge of everything, what a person can know; this is the knowledge that guides our lives, serves to preserve health, as well as discoveries in all arts (arts). And in order for it to become such, it must be deduced from the first causes so that the one who tries to master it (and this means, in fact, philosophize), begins with the study of these first causes, called the first principles. There are two requirements for these origins. First, they must be so clear and self-evident that, upon close examination, the human mind cannot doubt their truth; secondly, the knowledge of everything else must depend on them so that, although the foundations could be cognized in addition to the knowledge of other things, these latter, on the contrary, could not be cognized without the knowledge of the first principles. Then it is necessary to try to derive knowledge about things from those principles on which they depend, so that in the entire series of conclusions nothing is encountered that would not be completely obvious. In reality, God alone is quite wise, for he possesses perfect knowledge of everything; but people can also be called more or less wise according to how much or how little they know the truths about the most important subjects. With this, I suppose, all knowledgeable people will agree.

Further, I would propose to discuss the usefulness of this philosophy and at the same time would prove that philosophy, since it extends to everything accessible to human knowledge, only distinguishes us from savages and barbarians, and that each people is the more civilized and educated, the better it is in it. philosophize; therefore, there is no greater good for the state than to have true philosophers. Moreover, it is important for any person not only to live next to those who are devoted in soul to this occupation, but indeed it is much better to devote oneself to it, just as it is undoubtedly preferable in life to use one's own eyes and, thanks to them, receive pleasure from beauty and color, rather than close eyes and follow the lead of another; however, this is still better than closing your eyes and relying only on yourself. Indeed, those who lead a life without philosophy have completely closed their eyes and do not try to open them; meanwhile, the pleasure that we get in the contemplation of things that are accessible to our eyes is incomparable with the pleasure that gives us the knowledge of what we find with the help of philosophy. Moreover, for the direction of our morals and our lives, this science is more necessary than using the eyes to guide our steps. Foolish animals that must take care only of their body continuously, and are only busy looking for food for it; for a person, the main part of which is the mind, in the first place should be concern for obtaining his true food - wisdom. I am firmly convinced that many people would not hesitate to do this if they only hoped for success and knew how to do it. There is no noble soul that would be so attached to the objects of the senses that someday would not turn from them to some other, greater good, although she often does not know what the latter is. Those to whom fate is most favorable, who have an abundance of health, honor and wealth, are no more free from such a desire; I am even convinced that they yearn more than others for benefits greater and more perfect than those that they possess. And such a supreme good, as the natural reason shows even besides the light of faith, is nothing but the knowledge of the truth by its root causes, i.e. wisdom; the latter is philosophy. Since all this is quite true, it is not difficult to be convinced of this, as long as everything is correctly deduced.

But since this belief is contradicted by experience showing that people who practice philosophy are often less wise and less reasonable than those who have never devoted themselves to this occupation, I would like here to briefly summarize what are the sciences that we now possess. , and what level of wisdom these sciences reach. The first step contains only those concepts that are so clear in themselves that they can be acquired without reflection. The second stage covers everything that gives us sensory experience. The third is what communication with other people teaches. Here we can add, in fourth place, the reading of books, of course not all, but mainly those written by people who are able to give us good instructions; it's like a kind of communication with their creators. All the wisdom that one usually possesses is acquired, in my opinion, only in these four ways. I do not include divine revelation here, for it does not gradually, but immediately elevates us to an infallible faith. However, at all times there were great people who tried to ascend to the fifth degree of wisdom, much higher and more faithful than the previous four: they were looking for the first reasons and true principles on the basis of which everything available for knowledge could be explained. And those who showed special diligence in this were named philosophers. No one, however, as far as I know, has successfully solved this problem. The first and most prominent of the philosophers whose writings have come down to us were Plato and Aristotle. The only difference between them was that the former, brilliantly following the path of his teacher Socrates, was innocently convinced that he could not find anything reliable, and was content with setting out what seemed to him probable; for this purpose, he accepted certain principles, through which he tried to give explanations for other things. Aristotle did not have such sincerity. Although he was a student of Plato for twenty years and accepted the same principles as the latter, he completely changed the way they were presented and presented as true and correct what, most likely, he himself never considered so. Both of these richly gifted husbands possessed a significant share of wisdom, attained by the four means indicated above, and therefore acquired such great fame that descendants preferred to adhere to their opinions rather than seek out the best. The main dispute among their students was primarily about whether everything should be doubted, or whether something should be taken for certain. This subject plunged both into ridiculous delusions. Some of those who defended doubt extended it to everyday actions, so that they neglected prudence, while others, the defenders of certainty, assuming that this latter depends on feelings, relied entirely on them. This went so far that, according to legend, Epicurus, contrary to all the arguments of astronomers, dared to assert that the Sun is no more than what it seems. Here, in most disputes, one mistake can be noticed: while the truth lies between the two defended views, each departs from it the farther, the more heatedly argues. But the delusion of those who were too inclined to doubt did not have a long following, and the delusion of others was somewhat corrected when they learned that feelings deceive us in very many cases. But as far as I know, the bug was not completely fixed; it was not said that rightness is not inherent in feeling, but only in reason, when it clearly perceives things. And since we only have the knowledge acquired in the first four stages of wisdom, we should not doubt what seems to be true about our everyday behavior; however, we should not take this as immutable, so as not to reject our opinions about something, where the evidence of reason requires us to do so. Not knowing the truth of this position, or knowing, but neglecting it, many of those who wanted to be philosophers in recent centuries blindly followed Aristotle and often, violating the spirit of his writings, ascribed to him different opinions, which he, upon returning to life, would not recognize as his own, but those whoever did not follow him (among them there were many excellent minds) could not help but be imbued with his views even in their youth, since only his views were studied in schools; therefore, their minds were so filled with the latter that they were not able to pass to the knowledge of the true principles. And although I appreciate them all and do not want to become odious by condemning them, I can give you one piece of evidence that, I believe, none of them would dispute. Namely, almost all of them believed for the beginning something that they themselves did not know at all. Here are examples: I do not know anyone who would deny that earthly bodies are inherent in heaviness; but although experience clearly shows that bodies called weighty tend to the center of the earth, we still do not know from this what is the nature of what is called gravity, i.e. what is the reason or what is the beginning of the fall of bodies, but they must learn about it in some other way. The same can be said about emptiness and about atoms, about warm and cold, about dry and wet, about salt, sulfur, mercury and all such things, which are taken by some for the beginning. But not a single conclusion drawn from an unobvious beginning can be obvious, even if this conclusion was drawn in the most obvious way. It follows from this that not a single conclusion based on such principles could lead to reliable knowledge of anything and that, therefore, it could not advance a single step in the search for wisdom. If something true is found, then this is done ns otherwise than using one of the four above methods. However, I do not want to belittle the honor to which each of these authors can claim; for those who are not engaged in science, I must say the following as a consolation: as travelers, if they turn their backs to the place where they are striving, they move away from it the more, the longer and faster they walk, so that, although they turn then on the right path, however, they will not reach the desired place as soon as if they did not go at all - the same happens with those who use false principles: the more they care about the latter and the more they care about deriving various consequences from them, considering themselves good philosophers, the farther they go from the knowledge of truth and wisdom. From this we must conclude that those who have learned least of all what until now have usually been designated by the name of philosophy are the most capable of grasping true philosophy.

Having clearly shown all this, I would like to present here arguments that would testify that the principles that I propose in this book are the very true principles with the help of which one can reach the highest level of wisdom (and this is the highest good of human life ). Only two reasons are enough to confirm this: first, that these origins are very clear, and second, that everything else can be derived from them; apart from these two conditions, no other conditions are required for the initials. And that they are quite clear, I easily show, first, from the way in which I found these principles, namely, by discarding everything that I might have had the opportunity to doubt in the least; for it is certain that everything that cannot be discarded in this way after sufficient consideration is the clearest and most obvious of all that is accessible to human knowledge. So, for one who would begin to doubt everything, it is impossible, however, to doubt that he himself exists while he doubts; who thinks like this and cannot doubt himself, although he doubts everything else, does not represent what we call our body, but is what we call our soul or the ability to think. I took the existence of this ability as the first principle, from which I deduced the most clear consequence, namely, that there is God - the creator of everything that exists in the world; and since he is the source of all truths, he did not create our reason by nature in such a way that the latter could be deceived in judgments about things perceived by him in the clearest and most distinct way. These are all my principles, which I use in relation to the immaterial, i.e. metaphysical, things. From these principles I deduce in the most clear way the beginnings of bodily things, i.e. physical: precisely that there are bodies that are extended in length, width and depth, have different shapes and move in different ways. Such, in general, are all those principles from which I deduce the truth about other things. The second basis, testifying to the evidence of the foundations, is this: they were known at all times and were even considered by all people as true and undoubted, except for the existence of God, which was questioned by some, since too much importance was attached to sensory perceptions, and God cannot be to see or touch. Although all these truths, which I took as beginnings, have always been known to everyone, however, as far as I know, until now there was no one who would have taken them for the beginning of philosophy, i.e. who would understand that knowledge about everything that exists in the world can be deduced from them. Therefore, it remains for me to prove here that these principles are precisely such; It seems to me that it is impossible to imagine this better than by showing by experience, precisely by calling the readers to read this book. After all, although I do not speak about everything in it (and this is impossible), nevertheless, it seems to me that the questions that I had a chance to discuss are presented here in such a way that those who have read this book with attention will be able to make sure that there is no the need to look for other principles, besides the ones I have outlined, in order to achieve the highest knowledge that is available to the human mind. Especially if, after reading what I have written, they take into account how many different questions have been clarified here, and after looking at the writings of other authors, they will notice how little plausible solutions to the same questions are based on principles different from mine. And to make it easier for them to do this, I could tell them that the one who began to adhere to my views, much easier to understand the writings of others and establish their true value than the one who did not become imbued with my views; conversely, as I said above, if someone who started with ancient philosophy happens to read a book, then the more they worked on the latter, the less they usually turn out to be able to comprehend the true philosophy.

1. The problem of the method in the philosophy of modern times: the empiricism of F. Bacon.

2. Rationalism of R. Descartes.

3. Mechanistic materialism of the Enlightenment

4. Man and society in the works of F. Voltaire and J.-J. Russo.

Literature

1. Bacon F. New Organon. // Works. T.2. M., 1972.S. 7-36, 83-91.

2. Voltaire F. Philosophical writings. M., 1988.

3. Holbach P. Fav. Philos. manuf. In 2 volumes. M., 1963.

5. Kuznetsov V.N., Meerovsky B.V., Gryaznov A.F. Western European philosophy of the 18th century. M., 1986.

6. Narsky I.S. Western European philosophy of the 17th century. M., 1984.

7. Rousseau J.-J. Treatises. M., 1969.

8. Sokolov V.V. European philosophy of the 15th – 17th centuries. M., 1984.

The philosophy of modern times of the XVI-XVIII centuries is the period of the formation and formation of many natural sciences (physics, chemistry, mathematics, mechanics, etc.). Therefore, the central place in the problems of this period was taken by the question of the development of general scientific methods of cognition, and epistemology became the leading section of philosophy.

The Enlightenment occupies a special place in the philosophy of modern times, and its significance goes far beyond the era when its representatives lived and worked. Almost the entire 19th century was marked by the triumph of the ideas of the Enlightenment. One of the central in the philosophy of the Enlightenment was the doctrine of nature, which had a materialistic coloring and an anti-metaphysical orientation. In the opinion of the enlighteners, experiments and experiments should be based on the doctrine of nature. Please note that these views bear the stamp of mechanism: in the 18th century, chemistry and biology were in their infancy, therefore mechanics remained the basis of the general worldview. The laws of mechanics in this period were considered universal and were applied to both biological and social phenomena... Within the framework of the second question, it is supposed to get acquainted with the ideas of P. Holbach (work "The System of Nature") and the most striking example of mechanism - the views of J.O. La Mettrie (composition "Man-Machine").

The enlighteners saw a radical means of improving man and society in the dissemination of knowledge, science, in enlightenment and the correct education of man. Their worldview and philosophy were based on the conviction in the rationality of the universe, and therefore in the possibility of building a society in accordance with the reasonable principles of educating a “reasonable” person. It is on these premises that the third question of the seminar should be opened. What are the views of F. Voltaire and J.-J. Russ on the person and society? What are their similarities and differences? What spoils human nature and how to fix it? What options did these philosophers suggest?

Exercise 1.

“The difference in our opinions does not come from the fact that some people are more intelligent than others, but only from the fact that we direct our thoughts in different ways and do not consider the same things. For it is not enough to have a good mind, the main thing is to use it well ”. (R. Descartes. Izb. Production. M., 1960. S. 260).

Questions:

a) Why, starting from the 17th century, did they begin to emphasize the methodological, cognitive aspect of philosophy?

b) Is it possible to put an equal sign between philosophy and epistemology? If not, why not?

c) What modern direction in philosophy reduces philosophy only to the problems of scientific knowledge?

Task 2.

“For the sciences, however, good should be expected only when we ascend the true ladder, along continuous and not intermittent steps - from particulars to lesser axioms and then to intermediate ones, one higher than the other, and finally to the most general ones. For the lowest axioms differ little from bare experience. The highest and the most general (which we have) are speculative and abstract, and there is nothing solid about them. Average axioms are true, solid and vital, human affairs and destinies depend on them. And above them, finally, are located the most general axioms - not abstract, but correctly bounded by these average axioms. Therefore, the human mind should not be given wings, but rather lead and gravity, so that they hold back every jump and flight ... "

Questions:

a) What method of cognition are we talking about?

b) What steps should a person go through in the process of cognition?

Task 3.

French philosopher of the 17th century. K. Helvetius compared the process of cognition with the judicial process: five senses are five witnesses, only they can give the truth. His opponents, however, objected to him, claiming that he had forgotten the judge.

Questions:

a) What did the opponents mean by the judge?

b) What gnoseological position is Helvetius?

c) What is the advantage of such a position? What is its one-sidedness?

Task 4.

"Having thus converted everything that, in one way or another, we can doubt, and even assuming all this to be false, we can easily assume that there is neither God, nor Heaven, nor Earth, and that even we ourselves have no body, - but we still cannot assume that we do not exist, while we doubt the exclusivity of all these things. It is so absurd to assume that what thinks as non-existent while it thinks that, despite the most extreme assumptions , we cannot but believe that the conclusion, "I think, therefore I am," is true. "

Questions:

a) Which of the modern philosophers belongs to the expressed idea?

b) What is the initial basic principle of knowledge embedded in it?

c) What method (formulate it) will provide an opportunity to go through this path of knowledge, to comprehend the truth?

Task 5. F. Bacon (1561-1626)

1. What is truth, according to the philosopher?

2. What four idols leading human knowledge to the wrong path does Bacon highlight?

3.For what F. Bacon criticizes the ancient philosophers?

There are four kinds of idols that plague people's minds. In order to study them, let's give them names. Let's call the first kind the idols of the clan, the second - the idols of the cave, the third - the idols of the square and the fourth - the idols of the theater ...

The idols of the race find a basis in the very nature of man ... for it is false to assert that the feelings of man are the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions of both the senses and the mind rest on the analogy of man, and not on the analogy of the world. The human mind is likened to an uneven mirror, which, mixing its nature with the nature of things, reflects things in a twisted and disfigured form.

The idols of the cave are the delusions of the individual. After all, in addition to the mistakes inherent in the human race, each has its own special cave, which weakens and distorts the light of nature. This happens either from the special innate properties of each, or from upbringing and conversations with others, or from reading books and from the authorities whom one bows to, or due to the difference in impressions, depending on whether their souls are biased and predisposed, or souls cold-blooded and calm, or for other reasons ... That is why Heraclitus correctly said that people seek knowledge in small worlds, and not in a large, or general, world.

There are also idols that occur, as it were, due to the mutual connection and community of people. We call these idols, meaning the communication that generates them and the fellowship of people, the idols of the square. People are united by speech. Words are established according to the understanding of the crowd. Therefore, the bad and absurd establishment of words is surprisingly besetting the mind. The definitions and explanations with which learned people are accustomed to arm themselves and protect themselves do not help the cause in any way. Words directly violate the mind, confuse everything and lead people to empty and countless arguments and interpretations.

Finally, there are idols who have taken over the souls of people from different tenets of philosophy, as well as from the perverse laws of evidence. We call them theater idols, because we believe that, as there are accepted or invented philosophical systems, so many comedies have been staged and played, representing fictional and artificial worlds ... At the same time, we mean here not only general philosophical doctrines, but also numerous principles and axioms of sciences, which received strength as a result of tradition, faith and carelessness ...

Bacon F. New Organon // Works. In 2 t. M., 1978. T 2.P. 18 - 20, 22 - 23, 24, 25 - 26, 27, 28 - 30, 33

Task 6. Р . Descartes (1596-1650)

1. Expand the content of the expression "I think, therefore I am." Why was this expression laid the foundations of rationalism as the most influential trend in the philosophy of modern times?

2. On what basis R. Descartes rational cognition considers it more accurate than the sensual?

3. What cognitive steps following after substantiation of the initials should be taken, according to R. Descartes?

4. List the basic rules of the deductive method according to R. Descartes. Can this method be considered strictly scientific?

5. What is the ultimate goal of cognition in accordance with the rationalistic Cartesian method?

[RATIONALISM]

I am, I exist - that is certain. For how long? As much as I think, for it is also possible that I would completely cease to exist if I ceased to think. Therefore, strictly speaking, I am only a thinking thing, that is, spirit, or soul, or mind, or mind.<…>... And what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, asserts, desires, does not want, imagines and feels<…>.

[BASIC RULES OF THE METHOD]

And just as an abundance of laws often gives rise to the justification of vices and the state is better governed if there are few laws, but they are strictly observed, so instead of a large number of rules that make up logic, I concluded that four of the following would be enough, if only I have made a firm decision to abide by them at all times, without any retreat.

The first is to never accept for true anything that I would not have known as such with evidence, i.e. carefully avoid haste and prejudice, and include in my judgments only what appears to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that it gives me no reason to question them.

The second is to divide each of the difficulties I am considering into as many parts as necessary in order to better resolve them.

The third is to arrange your thoughts in a certain order, starting with the objects of the simplest and easily recognizable, and ascending little by little, as by steps, to the knowledge of the most complex, allowing the existence of order even among those that do not precede each other in the natural course of things.

And the last thing is to make lists everywhere so complete and reviews so comprehensive as to be sure nothing is missing.

... Thus, if one refrains from accepting as true anything that is not such, and always follows the order in which one should deduce one from the other, then there can be no truths so distant that they were incomprehensible, nor so secret that it was impossible to reveal them ... And at the same time, I may not seem too vain to you if you take into account that there is only one truth about every thing and whoever found it knows everything about it that can know ... So, for example, a child who has learned arithmetic, having made the correct addition, can be sure that he has found everything that the human mind can find regarding the desired sum.

Descartes R. Discourse on the method ... // Works: In 2 volumes - M., 1989. - T. 1. - P. 260 - 262.

1. FRANCIS BACON (1561-1626)

[EMPIRICAL METHOD AND INDUCTION THEORY]

Finally, we want to warn everyone in general so that they remember the true goals of science and rush to it not for entertainment and not out of competition, not in order to arrogantly look at others, not for the sake of benefits, not for the sake of fame or power or similar inferior goals, but for the benefit of life and practice, and so that they improve and guide her in mutual love. For from the striving for power the angels fell, but in love there is no excess, and never through it, neither angel nor man were in danger (3.1.67).

We consider induction to be that form of proof that reckons with the data of the senses and overtakes nature and rushes to practice, almost mixing with it.

So, the very order of the proof turns out to be directly opposite. Until now, business has usually been conducted in such a way that from feelings and particulars they immediately soared to the most general, as if from a solid axis around which reasoning should rotate, and from there everything else was deduced through middle sentences: the path, of course, is fast, but steep and not leading to nature, but predisposed to disputes and adapted to them. In our country, axioms are continuously and gradually established in order to arrive at the most general only last; and this most general thing itself is obtained not in the form of an empty concept, but turns out to be well-defined and such that nature recognizes in it something truly known to her and rooted in the very heart of things (3.1.71-72).

But in the very form of induction, and in the judgment we receive through it, we envision great changes. For the induction that dialecticians talk about and which occurs through a simple enumeration is something childish, since it gives shaky conclusions, is subject to danger from a contradictory example, looks only at the familiar, and does not lead to a result.

Meanwhile, the sciences need a form of induction that would produce separation and selection in experience and, through appropriate exceptions and rejections, would draw the necessary conclusions. But if that the usual way the judgment of dialecticians was so troublesome and weary of such minds, how much more will one have to work with this other method, which is extracted from the depths of the spirit, but also from the depths of nature?

But this is not the end. For we also put the foundations of the sciences deeper and strengthen, and we take the beginnings of research from greater depths than people have done until now, since we are testing what ordinary logic takes, as it were, on someone else's guarantee (3.1.72).

After all, the human mind, if it is directed to the study of matter (by contemplating the nature of things and the creations of God), acts in relation to this matter and is determined by it; if it is directed at itself (like a spider weaving a web), then it remains uncertain and although it creates some kind of fabric of science, amazing in the subtlety of the thread and the enormity of the labor expended, this fabric is absolutely unnecessary and useless.

This useless sophistication or inquisitiveness is of two kinds - it can relate either to the subject itself (such are empty speculation or empty arguments, examples of which can be found a lot in theology and philosophy), or to the method and method of research. The method of the scholastics is approximately as follows: first, they raised objections to any position, and then looked for the results of these objections, these same results for the most part represented only a dismemberment of the subject, while the tree of science, like a bunch of twigs in a famous old man, was not made up of individual rods, but represents their close relationship. After all, the harmony of the building of science, when its individual parts mutually support each other, is and should be a true and effective method of refuting all private objections (3.1.107).

[ABOUT THE DIGNITY AND EXCELLENCE OF THE SCIENCES]

Those who studied the sciences were either empiricists or dogmatists. Empiricists, like the ant, only collect and are content with the collected. Rationalists, like a spider, make a web of themselves. The bee chooses the middle way:

she extracts material from garden flowers and wildflowers, but arranges and modifies it according to her skill. The true business of philosophy does not differ from this either. For it is not based solely or predominantly on the forces of the mind and does not deposit intact material from natural history and mechanical experiments into consciousness, but changes it and processes it in the mind. So, good hope should be placed on a closer and more indestructible (which has not yet happened) union of these abilities - experience and reason (3.11.56-57).

For the construction of axioms, a different form of induction must be invented than the one that has been used so far. This form should be applied not only to the discovery and testing of what is called the beginnings, but even to the lesser and middle ones, and, finally, to all the axioms. Induction, which is accomplished by simple enumeration, is a childish thing: it gives shaky conclusions and is endangered by conflicting particulars, making a decision mostly on the basis of fewer facts than it should, and moreover only those that are available. Induction, on the other hand, which will be useful for the discovery and proof of the arts and sciences, must divide nature through appropriate distinctions and exclusions. And then after enough negative judgments, she must conclude positive. This is still not done, and not even attempted, except for Plato, who partly used this form of induction to extract definitions and ideas. But in order to build this induction or proof well and correctly, it is necessary to apply a lot of things that have not yet occurred to any mortal, and to spend more work than has been spent on the syllogism until now. The use of this induction should be used not only for the discovery of axioms, but also for the definition of concepts. This induction undoubtedly contains the greatest hope (3.P.61-62).

There are three sciences themselves, based more on fantasy and faith than on reason and evidence: this is astrology, natural magic and alchemy. Moreover, the goals of these sciences are by no means ignoble. After all, astrology seeks to reveal the secrets of the influence of the higher spheres on the lower ones and the domination of the former over the latter. Magic aims to direct natural philosophy from the contemplation of various objects to great achievements. Alchemy tries to separate and extract the foreign parts of things hidden in natural bodies; to cleanse the bodies themselves, contaminated with these impurities; to free what is bound, to bring to perfection what is not yet ripe. But the ways and means that, in their opinion, lead to these goals, both in the theory of these sciences and in practice, are replete with errors and all sorts of nonsense (3.1.110).

But the most serious of all mistakes is deviation from the ultimate goal of science. After all, some people strive for knowledge due to innate and boundless curiosity, others - for pleasure, others - in order to gain authority, still others - to gain the upper hand in competition and dispute, the majority - for material gain, and only very few - in order to be given from God direct the gift of reason for the benefit of the human race (3.1.115-116).

My goal is to show without embellishment and exaggeration the true weight of science among other things and, relying on divine and human evidence, to find out its true meaning and value (3.1.117).

Indeed, education frees man from savagery and barbarism. But the emphasis should be on this word "correct". After all, disorderly education acts rather in the opposite direction. I repeat, education destroys frivolity, frivolity and arrogance, forcing to remember, along with the case itself and about all the dangers and difficulties that may arise, to weigh all the arguments and evidence, both "for" and "against", not to trust that first draws attention to itself and seems attractive, and to enter every path, only having previously examined it. At the same time, education destroys empty and excessive surprise in front of things, the main source of any unjustified decision, for they are surprised at things either new or great. As for the novelty, there is no such person who, having deeply become acquainted with science and observing the world, would not be imbued with the firm thought: "There is nothing new on earth" (3.1.132-133).

Therefore, I want to conclude with the following thought, which, it seems to me, expresses the meaning of the whole reasoning: science tunes and directs the mind so that from now on it never remains at rest and, so to speak, does not freeze in its shortcomings, but, on the contrary, constantly encouraged himself to act and strived for improvement. After all, an uneducated person does not know what it means to plunge into oneself, to evaluate oneself, and does not know how joyful life is when you notice that it is getting better every day; if such a person accidentally possesses some dignity, then he brags about it and everywhere flaunts it and uses it, maybe even profitably, but, nevertheless, does not pay attention to developing it and increasing it. On the contrary, if he suffers from some defect, then he will apply all his skill and diligence to hide and hide it, but in no case will he correct it, like a bad reaper who does not stop reaping, but never sharpens his sickle. An educated person, on the contrary, not only uses his mind and all his virtues, but constantly corrects his mistakes and improves in virtue. Moreover, in general, it can be considered firmly established that truth and goodness differ from each other only as a seal and an imprint, for goodness is marked with the seal of truth, and, conversely, storms and downpours of vices and unrest descend only from clouds of delusion and lies (3.1. ).

Since college mentors “plant” and professors “irrigate,” I should now speak of the shortcomings in public education. , undoubtedly, I condemn in the strongest terms the scarcity of pay (especially here) for teachers of both general and special disciplines. After all, the progress of science requires, first of all, that the teachers of each discipline are selected from the best and most educated specialists in this field, since their work is not intended to meet transitory needs, but must ensure the development of science over the centuries. But this can be done only if such remuneration and such conditions are provided with which any specialist, the most outstanding in his field, can be fully satisfied, so that it will not be difficult for him to constantly engage in teaching and there will be no need to think about practical activity. In order for the sciences to flourish, you need to adhere to the military law of David: "To get an equal share to the one going into battle and remaining in the train", because otherwise the train will be poorly guarded. So teachers for science turn out to be, so to speak, the guardians and guardians of all its achievements, making it possible to fight on the field of science and knowledge. And therefore, the requirement that their payment be equal to the earnings of the same specialists engaged in practical activities is quite fair. If, however, a sufficiently large and generous reward is not established for the pastors of the sciences, then what can be said in the words of Virgil will happen:

And so that the famine of the fathers does not affect the frail offspring (3.1.142-143).

The most correct division of human knowledge is that which comes from the three faculties of the rational soul, which concentrates knowledge in itself. History corresponds to memory, poetry to imagination, philosophy to reason. By poetry, we mean here a kind of fictional story, or fictions, for the poetic form is in essence an element of style and thus refers to the art of speech, which we will talk about elsewhere. History, strictly speaking, deals with individuals who are considered under certain conditions of place and time. For, although natural history at first glance deals with species, this is only due to the similarity existing in many respects between all the objects of one species, so that if one is known, then all are known. If, somewhere, there are objects that are unique of their kind, for example the sun or the moon, or significantly deviate from the species, for example, monsters (monsters), then we have the same right to tell about them in natural history, with which we narrate in civil stories about outstanding personalities. All this has to do with memory.

Poetry - in the sense, as mentioned above - also speaks of single objects, but created with the help of imagination, similar to those that are objects of true history; however, at the same time, exaggeration and arbitrary depiction of what could never have happened in reality are quite often possible. The situation is exactly the same in painting. For this is all a matter of imagination.

Philosophy deals not with individuals and not with sensory impressions of objects, but with abstract concepts derived from them, the combination and separation of which on the basis of the laws of nature and the facts of reality itself is dealt with by this science. This belongs entirely to the realm of reason (3.1.148-149).

By its origin, knowledge can be likened to water: waters either fall from the sky or arise from the earth. In the same way, the initial division of knowledge must proceed from its sources. Some of these sources are in heaven, others are here on earth. All science gives us knowledge of two kinds. One is the result of divine inspiration, the other is sensory perception. As for the knowledge that is the result of training, it is not initially, but is based on previously acquired knowledge, just as it happens with water streams that feed not only from the sources themselves, but also take in the waters of other streams. Thus, we will divide science into theology and philosophy. We mean here divinely inspired, i.e. sacred, theology, and not natural theology, which we will talk about a little later. And this first, i.e. divinely inspired, we will refer to the end of the work in order to complete our reasoning with it, for it is a haven and a Saturday for all human reflections.

Philosophy has a threefold subject - God, nature, man and, accordingly, a threefold path of influence. Nature influences intelligence directly, i.e. as if by direct rays; God, on the other hand, acts on him through an inadequate environment (ie, through creations) with refracted rays; man, becoming himself the object of his own knowledge, affects his intellect with reflected rays. Consequently, it turns out that philosophy is divided into three doctrines: the doctrine of deity, the doctrine of nature, the doctrine of man. Since the various branches of science cannot be likened to several lines diverging from one point, but rather they can be compared with the branches of a tree growing from one trunk, which, before splitting into branches, remains in a certain area whole and single, then before go to the consideration of the parts of the first division, it is necessary to admit one universal science, which would be, as it were, the mother of other sciences and in their development would take the same place as that common section of the path, after which the roads begin to diverge in different directions. We will call this science "the first philosophy", or "wisdom" (once it was called the knowledge of things divine and human). We cannot oppose this science to any other, because it differs from other sciences more in its boundaries than in content and subject, considering things only in the very general form (3.1.199-200).

We can say that the teaching of nature should be divided into the study of causes and the obtaining of results: into parts - theoretical and practical. The first explores the depths of nature, the second remakes nature, like iron on an anvil. I know very well how closely cause and effect are interconnected, so that sometimes when presenting this question, we have to talk about both at the same time. But since every sound and fruitful natural philosophy uses two opposite methods: one that goes back from experience to general axioms, the other leads from general axioms to new discoveries, I think it most reasonable to separate these two parts - theoretical and practical - from each other and in the intention of the author of the treatise, and in its very content (3.1.207).

And of course, without much damage to the truth, it would be possible even now, following the ancients, to say that physics studies that which is material and changeable, while metaphysics is mainly that which is abstract and unchangeable. On the other hand, physics sees in nature only external existence, movement and natural necessity, while metaphysics also sees mind and idea. [...] We have divided natural philosophy into researching causes and obtaining results. We related the study of the causes to theoretical philosophy. We have divided the latter into physics and metaphysics. Consequently, the true principle of the separation of these disciplines must inevitably follow from the nature of the reasons that are the object of research. Therefore, without any ambiguities and circumlocutions, we can say that physics is the science that studies the acting cause and matter, metaphysics is the science of form and final cause (3.1.209-210).

We believe that the most correct division of abstract physics is its division into two sections: the doctrine of the states of matter and the doctrine of aspirations (appetitus) and motions (3.1.220).

We now turn to metaphysics. We referred to it as the study of formal and final causes. This might seem useless insofar as it relates to forms, for it has long been firmly held that no amount of human effort can reveal the essential forms of things or their true distinguishing features (3.1.225).